The President’s Afghanistan speech has sparked partisan debate over that military conflict. Today marks an important anniversary in the historical context of the Afghanistan war. Historical context raises legitimate questions over what U.S. policy should be in a conflict that looks like a no-win situation.
Today marks the anniversary of Pakistan’s 1971 preemptive strike on Indian air bases. This preemptive strike sparked a brief Indo-Pakistani War that resulted in a humiliating Pakistani defeat. Pakistan crushingly surrendered half its territory to India, and its military was decimated. It was a bruising psychological defeat for the Pakistani people (who had been tricked by state run media propaganda) and military personnel, including Pervez Musharraf.
Pakistan’s defeat led to their nuclear ambitions and rising jihadism. Pakistan’s nuclear project (Project 706) resulted directly from their defeat. Writer Steve Coll (author of the excellent pre-9/11 narrative, Ghost Wars) argues that defeat also sowed the seeds for Pakistani support of jihadists, used to attack the Soviets in Afghanistan and India in Kashmir. Today, jihadists still plague Afghanistan and threaten nuclear-armed Pakistan’s stability.
Afghanistan’s jihadists pose a destabilizing threat to the region and nuclear-armed Pakistan. The concern is both genuine and international (not just a U.S. problem). Senate candidate Chuck DeVore seems to understand this in condemning Obama’s plan as “a recipe for strategic failure” because “the number of Americans is insufficient” and withdrawal will lead to the fall of “thoroughly corrupt and infamously weak” Afghan government, fueling more jihadi destabilization. “Victory,” says DeVore, “Should be defined as denying al-Qaeda safe haven from which to plan and execute further attacks.” Yet, the goal might be defined more broadly – promoting regional stability and preventing nuclear-armed jihadism.
It is hard to see how Obama’s “exit strategy” (cut-and-run) serves the national interest. Yet, Barbara Boxer opposed military action in Afghanistan and supports “cut-and-run”. While many on the left and right believe that the Iraq conflict was a mistake, DeVore is right when he says, “Afghanistan is not Iraq.” Still, Democrats argue that we can’t afford it (even while spending trillions on bailouts, “stimulus”, cash-for-clunkers, and are seeking a government healthcare entitlement). But can we afford not to take action?
It seems undeniable that Afghanistan is a “no win” in the conventional sense. But, the threat of nuclear jihadism is not mere right-wing “fear-mongering”. Turning your back on very real threats doesn’t make those threats disappear. Historical context suggests that the problem is very real, very old, and very persistent (a “no-win”). But, does “no win” mean “no action”?
The Soviet at the peak had about 118,000 Troops and were tring to install a Communist government on an area that has always been very independant and diverse. We were also supporting the opposition.
With the increase the total troop level will be near 150,000 and we are trying to work with the local tribal leaders and the state.
A loose conferderation of tribal leaders and a weak central government working together to move forward may just work. It worked here just fine with 13 colonies and a weak central government. Later we came together later but not after many battles and a civil war.
This is a new approach and I am hopeful it will work.
My understanding while hearing the speech was that July 2011 was the target date to implement another plan that would result in a planned and careful withdrawal of troops, conditions permitting.
Nothing wrong with having a plan with an end date, perhaps we should do that with a lot of other programs so that they are all reviewed periodically.
My recommendation is that everyone start reading the Free Range International Blog. If you’re not reading MilBlogs, you really don’t have a read on the boots-on-the-ground reporting.
Over and out.
An Army Wife
Jim,
The problem that I see with a planned withdrawal date is the signal it sends both to jihadists and the Afghan “government”. Jihadists may be emboldened to intimidate tribal and other leaders, as well as the citizenry, further destabilizing a shaky Afghan nation.
In any case, I think it unrealistic to believe that the U.S. can win a conventional military victory in this country against this enemy. It seems to me that the U.S. military will be necessary to combat jihadist resurgence for the foreseeable future.
That is a tragedy for the U.S. military, their families, and the nation. The international community needs to step up and do their part to prevent jihadists from acquiring nuclear weapons, for the sake of the entire world.